We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. W e show that the economy has two steady states with di erent levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education e ort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' e orts have long-lasting e ects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.
Introduction
Mohammedans are Mohammedans because they are born and reared among the sect, not because they have thought it out and can furnish sound reasons for being Mohammedans; we know w h y Catholics are Catholics; why Presbyterians are Presbyterians; why Baptists are Baptists; why Mormons are Mormons; why thieves are thieves; why monarchists are monarchists; why Republicans are Republicans and Democrats, Democrats. We know that it is a matter of association and sympathy, not reasoning and examination; that hardly a man in the world has an opinion on morals, politics, or religion that he got otherwise than through his associations and sympathies.
Mark Twain
Recent scandals in Japan, Italy and Spain show that corruption is not an exclusive phenomenon of underdeveloped countries. Countries with similar degrees of development exhibit enormous di erences in the levels of corruption. Models linking corruption solely with the degree of economic development cannot explain these facts. Nor are they fully captured by institutional di erences. Incentive and punishment s c hemes for corrupt activities certainly in uence the level of corruption, but a given scheme does not work equally well in all countries. This suggests that corruption may be due, at least in part, to cultural elements.
Several papers have addressed the question why countries with the same level of development and similar institutions may h a v e drastically di erent levels of corruption, using models with multiple steady states. In the existing literature, this multiplicity is reached by assuming some heterogeneity among economic agents, namely economic agents have heterogenous costs when engaging in corrupt activities e.g. Andvig and Moene 1990 , Cadot 1987 , Carrillo 1998 , Casagrande 1998a , Casagrande 1998b , Lui 1986 , Sah 1988 , Tirole 1996 . Typically, these costs are non-monetary or moral 1 and exogenous to the model. In our view, the assumption of a xed exogenous structure of non-monetary costs is unsatisfactory: if we argue that di erent levels of corruption might be caused by di erent moral costs we need to explain why di erent countries may h a v e di erent moral costs in the rst place. The contribution of the present paper is to address this question. It focuses on the cultural transmission of corruption and develops policy measures which can reduce corruption within this framework. To k eep the model simple, we assume that there are only two possible types of agents: honest moral agents who su er some utility loss due to the feeling of guilt when engaging in corrupt activities and potentially dishonest agents who only care about monetary payo s. Since morality is a result of socialization, the distribution of these types is endogenized in our model. This is done by modeling explicitly how di erent attitudes against corruption are transmitted over di erent generations. The crucial point of this paper is that while these values are transmitted from one generation to the next, the incentives of parents to shape their o springs' attitudes towards corruption depend on economic factors.
In this paper we focus on the intergenerational transmission of attitudes against corruption, incorporating both vertical transmission, with o springs learning from their parents, and oblique transmission, with o springs learning from some member of the parent's generation see Boyd and Richerson 1985. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1982 provide evidence for vertical transmission of cultural traits such as religious beliefs, political attitudes, the frequency of praying and attending church, sportive practices, the frequency of listening to classical music, salt usage...etc. LeBras and Todd 1981 hypothesize that family structure strongly in uences political beliefs. Phenomena like the Ma a seem to have their origin in societies where families are strong institutions and children are exposed, from the very beginning, to a homogenous set of cultural models in the family Cavalli-Sforza 1996.
An example of the in uence of oblique transmission on corruption levels is Hong Kong where public attitudes against corruption changed drastically in the last decades due to the Independent Commission Against Corruption ICAC and especially its community relations department. The main emphasis of the ICAC education program was to build a strong altruism and a sense of responsibility in oneself and toward the others, de-emphasizing the importance of getting money and getting ahead at the expenses of the others Clark 1987 2 . Some empirical studies point out that the perception of corruption as a social problem in Hong Kong depends to some extent o n age and therefore on the time the di erent groups were exposed to the ICAC. For instance, in 1986, 75.1 of the 15-24 age group which had been subject to the ICAC's education program for about 13 years believed that corruption was a social problem whereas only 54 of the 45-64 age group who were born and lived their formative years when the ICAC didn't exist agreed with that.
Hong Kong's anti-corruption measures are considered as very successful. Indeed many a n ti-corruption groups and governments encouraged an academic debate in order to assess whether and in how far to imitate Hong Kong. Examples are the Chicago Ethics Project who seriously considered implementing Hong Kong's policies 3 , and China, whose State Administration of Industry and Commerce SAIC periodically launches ideological anti-corruption campaigns as a key part of all Chinese anti-2 The declared goals of ICAC w ere: To c hange people's behaviour so that they will not engage in corrupt behaviour initially for fear of detection deterrence, later because they cannot prevention and yet later because they do not wish to attitude change. In order to achieve this, ICAC did not only rely on an education campaign but also changed the incentive system. These anti-corruption measures will be considered in our model. 3 These considerations are re ected in a special issue of the journal Corruption and Control 1989 where academics like Gardiner, Clark and Johnston express their pros and contras to this idea. corruption campaigns. In the present paper we examine under which circumstances education campaigns successfully reduce the level of corruption in the population. It will be shown that education campaigns do not necessarily reduce and might e v en increase corruption.
Vertical and oblique transmission of morality are incorporated into our theory by assuming that ethics against corruption are transmitted via education. The transmission model is similar to Bisin and Verdier 1996. A simple overlapping generation model with principal-agent relation, rational expectations and random matching is postulated. In each period, in nitely lived principals are randomly matched to the agents. At a n y time period an agent m a y give birth to a child who will become active in the next period. During the rearing period the parent has to educate his child. Stochastic death keeps the population constant. Parents care about their children and want to maximize their child's well-being. However, given that they do not know what is best for their child, they evaluate their child's welfare as if it were their own 4 . Their own preferences are the best proxy they have for evaluating their child's wellbeing. Following Bisin and Verdier 1996 the cultural parent c hooses the coe cient of cultural transmission, or the education e ort i.e., the probability with which the parent's cultural trait is adopted by the child. In the basic model, when the child does not learn from the parent, he imitates a randomly chosen member of the parent's generation 5 . In this world, if education were free, parents would choose to transmit their preferences with probability 1 and the society w ouldn't evolve. If education in the family were prohibitively expensive, new agents would follow a conformist learning mechanism, and the spread of the most frequent trait would be observed. The higher the education e ort, the smaller the importance of this frequency-dependent bias Boyd and Richerson 1985. In our model, as in a typical principal-agent model, corruption exists because of asymmetric information and costly monitoring. In our information structure each principal knows the exact proportion of dishonest players in the population and has some imperfect information about the honesty of the agent he is facing. There is no information leakage across principals.
Our basic principal-agent model is related to Tirole 1996. In each period a principal has to assign a project to the agent he is randomly matched with. There are two types of projects. Project 1 is socially better than project 2 if managed with honesty. The reverse is true if the agent behaves dishonestly. The projects can be interpreted as two di erent public investments, one more costly than the other and with a higher social return if managed correctly. This project, by i n v olving a larger amount of money, is more susceptible to corruption selection of worse materials, manipulation of allocation mechanism such as auctions.... Think for instance of project 1 as the construction of new roads and project 2 as resources devoted to the maintenance of existing ones.
We show that under reasonable parameters both types of agents choose positive transmission coe cients. This implies that any stable steady state is interior and that corruption is never eliminated completely as long as some corrupt behaviour existed in the past. We show that under rational expectations there are two pure strategy steady states. In the low corruption steady state, the principals o er project 1 to all agents for whom there is no evidence of corrupt behaviour and project 2 to all those agents for whom such evidence exists. In the high corruption steady state only project 2 is o ered. In this case the existence of dishonest players exerts a negative externality on the honest players. The general suspicion prevents honest people from getting good projects like in Tirole 1996. However, while in Tirole's 1996 model cultural attitudes exist in xed proportions, in the present paper the proportion of types evolves endogenously. Therefore, it is a result and not an assumption of the model that corruption is never eliminated completely in steady state and the e ect of policies on the evolution of the proportions of di erent t ypes can be analyzed. Three parameter regimes are distinguished: i the high corruption steady state is reached always, ii the low corruption steady state is reached always and iii one of the steady states is reached depending on initial conditions. i and ii result from extremely poor or nearly perfect monitoring technologies of principals. Therefore, it seems a reasonable guess to assume that most countries are likely to be in iii.
For the latter case the paper develops some temporary policy measures in order to permanently manipulate the cultural transmission coe cients. The advantages and disadvantages of each measure are discussed. Two time consistent policy measures with long-lasting e ects on the level of corruption are proposed. The rst policy consists of a temporary increase in the monitoring expenditure and, consequently, in the accuracy of the information gathered by the principals. Such a policy can drive the economy out of the high corruption steady state and into the basin of attraction of the low corruption equilibrium. In the second policy the principals announce a future policy change. This announcement triggers a change in the education e orts exerted by the di erent t ypes of parents, which makes the policy announcement time consistent. We also discuss the e ect of temporary public education campaigns and show that they successfully reduce the level of corruptions if and only if they are intensive enough, i.e. if the public education e ort is high enough and the campaign is long-lasting. This condition seems to have been satis ed in the case of Hong Kong.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we i n troduce the model and characterize the steady states. Policy implications are spelt out in section 3 and the e ects of public education campaigns are discussed. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We propose a principal-agent model similar to Tirole's 1996. We consider a random matching model where each agent can never meet the same principal twice. At each time t ,1 t 1 e v ery active agent is matched with a new principal. The principal gives the agent one of 2 projects. Project 1 yields a higher payo to the principal than project 2 if the agent is honest, but is more susceptible to corrupt behaviour. Under 1 potentially dishonest agents are always dishonest. Thereafter, since we assume that 1 holds, we shall refer to potentially dishonest players as dishonest.
The model is a model of overlapping generations. A Poisson birth and death process is assumed keeping the population size of active agents constant. With probability an active agent will be active next period. With probability 1, an active agent i n t has a child which at the moment of birth does not have a n y predetermined preferences. The child is educated by the parent and becomes active i n t + 1 . Education shapes the child's preferences. The crucial assumption is that an agent cares about his o springs' welfare and tries to maximize the latter when deciding how m uch e ort to put into his child's education. Given that at the moment of education, the new born does not have any preferences, the parent e v aluates his child's future utility through his own eyes. In other words he uses his payo matrix as if it were his child's, like in Bisin and Verdier 1996 .
The education process works as follows: The parent educates his naive c hild with some education e ort . With probability equal to the education e ort, education will be successful and the child will be like his parent 6 . Otherwise, the child remains naive and gets randomly matched with somebody else whose preferences he will adopt. Consider an honest agent who has a child at time t is the dishonest parents' education e ort.
2.1
The education choice Let C be the cost of the education e ort and assume that C 0 = 0 , C 0 0 and C 00 0.
A parent o f t ype i chooses the education e ort 2 0; 1 that maximizes 6 Parents believe it is optimal for their child to be like themselves: while honest parents believe that their child will su er if behaving dishonestly, dishonest parents believe that their child will not maximize its monetary returns if honest. These are "reasonable" believes: both types of parents behave optimally given their preferences.
where we h a v e suppressed the time indicators.
Substituting 2-5 in 7; we get the optimal education e orts Proof. See appendix.
2.2
The principals' choice Each period a principal has to decide what project to delegate on the agent h e i s matched with. We assume that principals maximize their expected payo s and that they know the proportion of honest agents in the population but not the type of a particular agent. We assume that the principal can know with positive probability wether the agent he is facing is dishonest 7 . An honest agent will never be revealed as dishonest. There is no information leakage across principals 8 . If one principal learns that an agent is dishonest it can still be the case that in the future the same agent i s taken for an honest one. 7 Tirole 1996 assumes that the principal has some imperfect information about each agent's past behaviour: with probability he knows if the agent has been dishonest at least once in the past. Under this information structure corrupt new borns are indistinguisable from honest agents. With Tirole's story the qualitative results are the same but calculations are much more cumbersome. Notice that in Tirole the gain from being corrupt is higher in some cases since in the rst period of a dishonest's life cheating cannot be detected.
8 Information leakage across principals does not a ect the qualitative results of the paper.
2.3
The steady states.
We n o w c haracterize the steady states of the economy. Computing the right hand side of 15 for the di erent expected policy pro les we get the values above.
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The previous lemma compares the education e orts exerted by the two t ypes of parent for four di erent expectations, two of them stationary cases 1 and 2 and two of them involving a policy change at a future date T Proof. See appendix .
We refer to q and q as the low corruption and the high corruption steady states, respectively.
Observe that the steady state the system converges to depends for cases 1 and 2 on the location ofq with respect to q and q and in case 3, on the initial proportion of honest players. A too ine cient monitoring technique highq implies that the low corruption steady state q can never be reached. A very e cient technique avoids the high corruption steady state. The smallerq the larger the basin of attraction of q.
Policy measures.
Under rational expectations the steady state the system converges to is determined by the relative positions of q, q andq and in the case in whichalso by the initial proportion of honest agents. While the position of q only depends on the payo matrices of the agents, q andq also depend on the accuracy of the principals' information . Hence, feasible policy measures will have to a ect the remuneration to agents or the accuracy of principals' information or agents' expectations. We shall now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these measures.
Changing the remuneration to the agents will a ect equilibrium values directly. A n increase in the payo when agents behave honestly in project 1 B and in project 2 b increases the equilibrium proportion of honest players in the low and in the high corruption equilibria, respectively. The same is true for a decrease of B and b. However, principals will face some restrictions when choosing remunerations. Higher wages simultaneously increase B or b and B or b. In order to lower B or b principals would have to be able to limit the extent of corrupt activities somehow.
Another possibility t o c o n trol for corruption is to invest in monitoring. Notice, that an increase in the accuracy of principals' information and thereby in the probability of detecting fraudulent behaviour will shift the critical valueq t o a l o w er value, will increase the basin of attraction of the low corruption steady state and at the same time the proportion of honest behaviour in such an equilibrium. Since the choice of is in uenced by technological restrictions, unless some new monitoring technology is discovered, it is not reasonable to assume that principals can improve their information forever. The following argument shows that a temporary increase in spending on monitoring might be su cient to leave the high corruption steady state.
Assume thatand that there exists an such thatq = q , then the high corruption steady state can be left by a temporary increase in . Given , the separating strategy s is optimal and seemingly honest people will get project 1. By lemma 2 the high corruption steady state will be left if honest agents expect The principal can ensure this by reducing spending on monitoring to the original level in such a w a y thatq t is always smaller than q t in all periods t.
In the above policy measure principals behave optimally given the accuracy of their information . Therefore, if agents can observe h o w m uch principals spent o n monitoring the policy measure is perfectly credible. Moreover, this policy is feasible if the temporary increase in spending is o -set by the gains from reaching the low corruption steady state.
By a similar argument, principals could incur a cost by simply giving the good project in a bad environment q t q to stimulate education e orts of honest parents. In other words principals would have to apply the separating policy s despite its being sub-optimal in the short run. For this policy to be e ective agents would have t o believe that principals are willing to ignore their cut-o value over several periods. In contrast, a temporary increase in spending on monitoring di ers from simply ignoring the cut-o value since, under the former, the resulting behaviour of principals is always optimal given the observed increase in monitoring costs.
All policy measures discussed so far a ected agents' expectations indirectly. W e now consider an alternative policy which a ects agents' expectations directly: the high corruption steady state can be left by principals announcing a time consistent policy change in the future. Under this policy measure, principals will never ignore their cut-o value and therefore behave optimally both in the short and long run.
Assume that the economy is in the high corruption steady state; everybody is getting project 2. In the high corruption steady state no principal has an incentive t o give project 1 to anybody. Assume now, that at t principals commit to the policy pro le Figure 1 is an illustration of proposition 2. The economy is initially in the high corruption equilibrium. The continuous line is the value ofq: The announcement of the policy change in T = 1 5 increases the honest parents' e ort today and q starts growing. At T = 1 4 the economy has reached the critical valueq and from T = 1 5 on it is optimal to start o ering project 1 to seemingly honest agents. This way the society can leave the high corruption equilibrium after the time consistent announcement. The policy announcement is time consistent because at the moment of the change the proportion of honest players in the population is such that 14 is satis ed and s is the optimal policy sequence from then onwards. Observe that by proposition 1, the system converges to the low corruption steady state. The result is driven by the fact that the policy announcement raises the value of being honest more than it increases the value of being dishonest. Honest parents, foreseeing that in the future it will pay to be honest increase their education e ort once such a policy is announced.
The above policy measures all aim at a ecting the driving force of the population dynamics: the education e ort exerted by parents. In the above model, moral education is a purely private issue. We shall now analyze the e ectiveness of education campaigns in which the existing public education systems are used to emphasize moral values.
In most countries public education does not start immediately when a child is born. Usually, c hildren are exposed to the in uence of their parents before undergoing public education. To respect this common education structure we assume that only children who remain naive, i.e. who do not learn their preferences from their parents, can be in uenced by public education. An education campaign will be modeled as society or principals investing in public moral education by c hoosing a public e ort level to teach honest behaviour at school. Similar to private education e orts, the public education e ort represents the probability with which a c hild who did not learn from his parents adopts honest preferences in school. The new timing of moral education is as follows: as before, the education e ort of the parents determines the probability with which c hildren adopt the same preferences as their parents. With the complementary probability 1 , children remain naive in which case the public education e ort determines the probability with which c hildren become honest. With probability 1 , public education fails and children meet a random member of society whose preferences they adopt.
Public education a ects the probabilities of honest and dishonest children as fol- This di erence equation shows that i q = 1 is always a rest point of the system, ii q = 0 is only a rest if no public education exists = 0 , iii if an interior solution exists, the education e ort of dishonest parents is higher than of honest parents a b
. The introduction of public education has two opposite e ects: while its direct e ect is to increase the proportion of honest agents, its indirect e ect is to change the incentives for private education; honest parents educate less because public education increases the chances of their children getting the right preferences anyway while dishonest parents educate more. Which e ect will dominate partly depends on the value of . Notice, that if =1 the system converges to q = 1 although honest parents do not educate their children at all. Hence, for = 1 , q 0 for all q 1 . By continuity, there exists a such that for q 0 for all q 1 . Indeed, it is easy to see that for b 1 q = 1 is the only attractor 10 .
The above analysis establishes the success of a temporary intensive education campaign with a high enough . Suppose society is in the high corruption steady state and. The government launch e s a v ery intensive education campaign with b 1. The campaign a ects the population dynamics and the proportion of honest agents increases. The education campaign can be stopped once q t q; b y lemma 2 the system converges to the low corruption steady state q.
To summarize, temporary education campaigns will be successful in reducing corruption if they are intensive enough. If is too low, q t will remain belowq and it will not be optimal for principals to switch to the separating policy. Education campaigns work only if the investment in public education is high enough during the period of the campaign and the campaign lasts long enough.
Both conditions seemed to have been satis ed in the case of Hong Kong. The education e ort of the Independent Commission against Corruption ICAC had been very high and the project lasted a substantial period of time. Moreover, at least in early years, ICAC combined two policy measures discussed in our model: re-education and a change in the remunerations to agents to reduce the pro tability of corruption. This combination accelerates the move t o w ards the low corruption steady state.
Conclusion
There is evidence that corruption is at least partly due to cultural elements. Not in every country does the public opinion conceive corruption -at least small-scale corruption -as negative. Sentences like I w as corrupt but so was everybody else reveal that a generally corrupt environment can serve as a justi cation for one's own corrupt behaviour.
The present paper captures some cultural aspects of corruption. An agent is corrupt if corruption maximizes utility. H o w ever, utility is not only a ected by purely monetary rewards but also by the presence or absence of moral costs if engaging in corrupt activities. In the model remunerations were chosen such that an agent is either always honest or always corrupt. Analyzing this extreme case allows to single out the purely educational e ects on corruption levels. In order to do so it was assumed that new-born agents had to form their preferences and were in uenced by the education e ort exerted by their parent a s w ell as by the general corruption level of society. P arents care about their children and judge their children's utility a s i f i t w ere their own. The resulting dynamics had the realistic feature that the lower the proportion of a given type the higher its education e ort. This feature keeps the steady state o the boundary and avoids a complete elimination of corrupt or honest agents.
Taking the model seriously implies that corruption will never be eliminated completely, a view which is also expressed by Klitgaard 1988 . Indeed, there is no country without corruption although corruption levels vary widely across countries even with similar economic characteristics. The present model found two steady states one with a l o w and one with a high level of corruption in an otherwise identical economy. This shows the strength of cultural elements in determining the actual corruption levels of a society and implies that two countries with the same level of development and the same institutions against corruption may h a v e drastically di erent levels of corruption depending on the initial state of the society. In the high corruption steady state the public reputation outweighs individual reputation and thereby l o c ks society i n to highly corrupt behaviour. In the low corruption steady state individual reputation is decisive.
Controlling corruption imposes a cost on society. Individual behaviour has to be monitored. If monitoring is common and the technique is reliable, it pays less to be corrupt. This is also true for high nes. Both the present model and models concentrating purely on monetary rewards share this desirable feature. The advantage of the present approach is that it entails additional policy implications which can be cost-saving in the long run. High nes and high monitoring work only as long as they are implemented. If, however, young generations are educated to adapt a moral attitude against corruption, monitoring can be reduced while low corruption levels are preserved. Educating the young is the key element in reducing corruption successfully. Tirole, J. 1996 . A theory of collective reputation with applications to the persistence of corruption and rm quality, Review of Economic Studies, 63, 122. Since F 0 0 1 and F 0 1 1; 0 and 1 are unstable: Moreover F 0 q 0 for all q 2 0; minf1=2; q g maxf1=2; q g ; 1 : This, together with the fact that Fwhen q 2 0; q and Fwhen q 2 q ; 1 implies that q t converges to q for all q t 2 0; 1: Hence q is globally stable.
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Remark. Observe that we cannot characterize F 0 q in the interval minf1=2; q g ; maxf1=2; q g without further assumptions on the cost function C;although it is easy to see that 
